4 judges term SC full court meeting ‘stamp of approval’

4 judges term SC full court meeting ‘stamp of approval’

News Desk

ISLAMABAD, SEPT 8 /DNA/ – In yet another letter highlighting the rift within the judiciary, four Supreme Court (SC) judges expressed their reservations on Monday regarding the process being adopted for the review and approval of Supreme Court Rules 2025.

They dubbed the full court meeting, called for this purpose today, a mere “stamp of approval” for the rules, which they said were already decided and unilaterally approved.

The letter addressed to Chief Justice of Pakistan Yahya Afridi, a copy of which is available with Dawn.com, was sent by senior puisne judge Justice Mansoor Ali Shah, Justice Munib Akhtar, Justice Ayesha Malik, and Justice Athar Minallah.

They pointed out that “if the full court was not deemed necessary for the adoption of the rules themselves, how can it now be summoned to deliberate upon their amendment?”

The judges said the working paper for the meeting’s agenda stated that under Rule 1(4) of the Supreme Court Rules 2025, the CJP may “remove any difficulty in giving effect to the said rules” on the recommendations of a committee that was constituted by him and had already been formed.

Moreover, “the chief justice, through a letter dated August 12, 2025, informed the judges that the rules had already been approved through circulation and duly notified in the Gazette on August 9, 2025,” the judges highlighted.

Yet, they further stated, the CJP had sought suggestions “for further amendments” to the rules.

Calling into question the legality of the rules themselves, the judges noted that the “present Supreme Court rules were never placed before, nor approved by, the full court.”

Citing Article 191 of the Constitution, they said the SC had the “power to make rules regulating its practice and procedure, but this power is exercised collectively by the court as an institution”.

The judges concluded that any rules established “without deliberation and approval of the full court” lacked its approval and could not acquire “binding legal status”.

They were of the opinion that the rules, in their present form, “suffer from both substantive and procedural illegality”. In this connection, they expressed reservations rules were processed through circulation.

“Circulation is an administrative convenience to deal with routine or minor procedural matters; it is not, and cannot be, the vehicle for laying down the constitutional architecture of this court’s governance.

“Unless the full court had itself had expressly resolved to adopt circulation for this purpose the chief justice alone could not unilaterally resort to it.”