The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), formed in 1985 with great promise, was envisioned as a platform for promoting peace, prosperity, and mutual development among the eight member states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Nearly four decades later, the organization remains largely dysfunctional, unable to deliver on its core objectives. Despite being home to nearly a quarter of the world’s population, SAARC has not even come close to becoming an effective regional bloc like the European Union or ASEAN. The reasons for this failure are both political and structural.
At the heart of SAARC’s ineffectiveness lies the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. Political hostility, repeated military stand-offs, and zero-sum diplomacy between the two nuclear neighbors have cast a long shadow over the organization. No SAARC summit has been held since 2014, with the 2016 summit in Islamabad indefinitely postponed following India’s boycott after the Uri attack. This bilateral antagonism consistently hijacks regional agendas and paralyzes progress on initiatives that require unanimity.
Unlike other regional blocs, SAARC lacks strong institutional mechanisms. Its decisions are made by consensus — a model that is difficult to sustain when member states have deep political divides. The absence of a dispute resolution framework further handicaps SAARC. While economic cooperation, people-to-people connectivity, and regional development are the goals on paper, the lack of trust between member states makes implementation virtually impossible.
Another reason behind SAARC’s failure is its narrow scope and minimal funding. The organization has failed to evolve into a robust institution with the capacity to execute projects independently. Most of its initiatives exist only on paper or in pilot stages. For instance, the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and its proposed successor, SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area), have not meaningfully increased intra-regional trade, which remains among the lowest in the world — less than 5% of total trade of member states.
Contrast this with ASEAN, where members, despite historical disputes, have prioritized economic interdependence and regional integration. In SAARC, by comparison, smaller nations are often caught between India and Pakistan’s rivalry, leading them to seek bilateral partnerships outside the SAARC framework — further weakening the organization.
Moreover, China’s increasing influence in South Asia has led to geopolitical recalibrations. Countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives are forging closer economic ties with Beijing, making SAARC less relevant to their immediate priorities. India, too, has shifted its focus toward other regional groupings like BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), where Pakistan is not a member and hence friction is lower.
In conclusion, SAARC’s failure is not due to the lack of vision but the absence of political will and regional trust. Unless member states — especially India and Pakistan — choose cooperation over confrontation, SAARC will remain a dormant body. Reviving it requires a paradigm shift: from viewing regional cooperation as a zero-sum game to embracing it as a shared opportunity. Otherwise, the dream of a connected, prosperous South Asia will continue to be deferred — to the detriment of nearly two billion people.