China, Iran’s top trading partner and a major buyer of its oil, adopts an even more restrained stance. Beijing has supplied drones and negotiated missile deals but avoids overt involvement. Direct support would risk confrontation with the U.S. and Israel, potentially escalating into a third world war scenario
By Ansar Mahmood Bhatti
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iran, codenamed Operation Shield of Judah, targeting military installations, nuclear-related sites, and regime assets across Tehran, Isfahan, and other cities. President Donald Trump announced the start of “major combat operations,” framing the assault as necessary to eliminate imminent threats from Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missiles, following failed negotiations and Tehran’s refusal to dismantle key facilities.
The strikes mark a sharp escalation from the 12-day Israel-Iran air war in June 2025, which degraded but did not eliminate Iran’s capabilities. U.S. and Israeli officials have signaled broader aims, with Trump repeatedly stating that regime change in Iran “would be the best thing that could happen.” Reports indicate discussions of options ranging from limited punitive strikes to more aggressive actions targeting leadership, amid ongoing domestic unrest in Iran.
These intentions appear designed not merely to curb nuclear ambitions but to fundamentally alter or topple the Islamic Republic’s government, capitalizing on its perceived weakness after protests, economic strain, and prior military setbacks.
Iran has vowed a strong response, though its capacity remains questionable after successive degradations to air defenses and missile stocks. Retaliation could involve proxies, ballistic missiles, or asymmetric tactics, but sustaining a prolonged fight against U.S.-Israeli superiority poses challenges.
Russia, a key ally, has provided covert support to Iran, including a €500 million arms deal for advanced Verba anti-aircraft systems, with some deliveries possibly accelerated. However, Moscow’s deep entanglement in Ukraine now in its fourth year has exhausted resources, manpower, and stockpiles.
Expect rhetorical condemnation, diplomatic backing at the UN, and perhaps additional covert arms flows, but direct military intervention or large-scale aid is improbable. Russia’s priority remains survival in its own conflict, limiting contributions to Iran’s defense.
China, Iran’s top trading partner and a major buyer of its oil, adopts an even more restrained stance. Beijing has supplied drones and negotiated missile deals but avoids overt involvement. Direct support would risk confrontation with the U.S. and Israel, potentially escalating into a third world war scenario.
Unlike China’s open backing of Pakistan in India-Pakistan tensions—where U.S. involvement was absent and strategic ties with Islamabad were clear—the Iran case pits Beijing against Washington directly. Chinese interests favor stability for energy supplies and trade routes; escalation could disrupt global markets.
Beijing has urged evacuation of citizens, called for de-escalation, and will likely limit responses to diplomatic protests, UN vetoes, and behind-the-scenes mediation prioritizing long-term gains from diverted U.S. attention over risking direct entanglement.
Pakistan’s position is delicate. Recent warming ties with the U.S., including high-level visits and economic cooperation, complicate open condemnation of the strikes despite geographic proximity and Muslim solidarity with Iran. Islamabad may offer quiet mediation but is unlikely to take sides overtly.
This conflict tests great-power alliances. Russia and China will provide limited, deniable support without full commitment, hedging to protect their core interests. The regime-change dimension raises the stakes, but miscalculation remains the greatest risk in an already volatile region.
