Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
Assistant Professor Pakistan Studies
Imperial College of Business Studies Lahore
After the Twenty-five years the attacks of September 11, 2001, the question is not
disappeared: why did the attackers do it? The question is uncomfortable, but
avoiding uncomfortable questions does not make a society safer. Twenty-five years
after the attacks, Americans have every reason to remember not only what
happened but also the circumstances and ideas that made the attacks possible. The
September 11 attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda, a militant organisation that
claimed a religious justification for its violence and drew upon an extremist
interpretation of Islam. Its leaders presented their struggle as a religious war and
sought to give political grievances a theological character. Understanding this
ideological dimension is essential if the history of 9/11 is to be understood
properly.
Yet acknowledging the role of Islamist extremism should not be confused with
blaming Islam or Muslims. These are entirely different propositions. Islam is a
religion followed by more than a billion people across the world, most of whom
have nothing to do with political violence. Muslims themselves have repeatedly
been among the victims of militant organisations. Countries such as Pakistan have
suffered enormously from terrorism carried out in the name of religion.
If the ideological motivation of a terrorist organisation is deliberately removed
from the discussion, the public is left with an incomplete explanation. The
challenge for American society, therefore, is to remember 9/11 without either
sanitising its causes or turning remembrance into a general indictment of Muslims.
There is a temptation, particularly after the passage of time, to reduce historic
tragedies to familiar phrases. The attacks also exposed failures of intelligence,
weaknesses in coordination among security agencies and a serious underestimation
of the threat posed by al-Qaeda. They changed American foreign policy, reshaped
airport security, transformed intelligence cooperation and influenced wars whose
consequences are still visible today. The most important lesson may be that
terrorism cannot be defeated merely through military force. Ideas, networks,
financing, recruitment, propaganda and political grievances all form part of the
environment in which extremist organisations operate.
The United States responded to 9/11 by launching the war in Afghanistan and later
invading Iraq. The two conflicts had different origins, but both became part of the
wider American response to terrorism. The consequences were enormous.
Afghanistan experienced two decades of foreign military involvement before the
Taliban returned to power in 2021. Iraq suffered invasion, political instability and
sectarian conflict. The wider Middle East was profoundly affected. Al-Qaeda was
severely weakened, its leadership disrupted and its operational capacity reduced.
Osama bin Laden was eventually killed. Yet the broader phenomenon of militant
violence did not disappear. Other organisations emerged, most notably the Islamic
State, while extremist networks adapted to new technologies and political
circumstances. The lesson is not that military action is irrelevant. States have a
responsibility to protect their citizens and confront organisations that use violence
against civilians. But military power alone cannot eliminate an ideology,
particularly when that ideology is able to exploit political grievances, social
exclusion, weak institutions and conflicts in different parts of the world.
Pakistan’s experience after 9/11 was not that of a distant observer. It became a
frontline state in the international campaign against terrorism. The country paid a
heavy price. Militancy affected major cities as well as remote areas. Schools,
mosques, markets, military installations and public institutions became targets.
Pakistan’s struggle also demonstrates why the language used to describe religious
extremism matters. The state cannot fight terrorism effectively if every criticism of
extremism is presented as an attack on religion. At the same time, it cannot defeat
militant organisations if it refuses to examine the narratives through which they
justify violence. There is a difficult but necessary middle ground: defend religious
freedom while rejecting the use of religion as a justification for murder.
A mature democracy should be capable of discussing the ideology that motivated
the attackers without descending into collective suspicion of Muslim citizens.
American Muslims are part of the American story, just as Muslim communities
elsewhere have their own histories of confronting extremism. They should not be
made responsible for crimes committed by people who claimed to act in their
name. Indeed, one of the most damaging consequences of terrorism can be the
social division it creates. Terrorist organisations want fear to spread beyond the
immediate victims. They seek to provoke governments into excessive responses,
communities into mutual suspicion and societies into polarisation. When ordinary
citizens begin to regard one another through the lens of religious identity, terrorists
achieve something even when they are militarily defeated.
The United States should remember the victims without forgetting the perpetrators'
ideological justification. It should examine intelligence failures without weakening
public trust in institutions. It should defend national security without sacrificing
civil liberties. And it should confront Islamist extremism without turning Islam
itself into the enemy. There is also a lesson here for the media and educational
institutions. Young people should learn what happened on September 11, but they
should also learn how extremist movements emerge, how propaganda works, how
political grievances are manipulated and why religious ideas can be distorted for
political purposes.
The 25th anniversary of 9/11 is an opportunity for honest reflection and preserve
the difficult questions. Why did the attackers believe that murdering civilians was
justified? How did al-Qaeda recruit and radicalise its members? Why were warning
signs missed? What mistakes followed the attacks? Which policies made world
safer and which produced new dangers? And what forms of extremism remain
capable of exploiting modern societies today? These questions cannot be answered
through slogans.
Twenty-five years is long enough for memories to fade but not long enough for the
lessons of 9/11 to become irrelevant. The world has changed dramatically since
that morning. Terrorist organisations have changed their methods. Technology has
transformed propaganda and recruitment. Political conflicts have shifted. Yet the
ability of extremist movements to turn grievances into violence remains a serious
concern.
