T.M. Awan
The November 3, 2026 US midterm elections have dealt a significant political setback to President Donald Trump. Democrats have secured control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, ending the Republican majority in Congress. The economy, rising living costs and the war with Iran featured prominently in the election debate. The results reflect public frustration with the administration’s domestic and foreign policy priorities, including the economic consequences of a prolonged conflict. Iran’s war has therefore become more than a foreign policy challenge for Washington; it has also turned into a domestic political liability for Trump.
Israel is facing its own political uncertainty. In the October 27 elections, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud emerged as the largest party with 27 seats, but his political bloc secured only 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, short of the 61 required for a parliamentary majority. On November 7, President Isaac Herzog announced his intention to give opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot the opportunity to form a government. The formal mandate is scheduled for November 8. Netanyahu’s political future has consequently entered a critical phase.
These developments raise a central question: has Iran managed to turn the regime-change campaign launched against it into a political setback for its principal adversaries?
The US-Israeli military campaign against Iran was not limited to destroying military installations or weakening its defence capabilities. A major strategic objective was to undermine the Islamic Republic and create conditions for regime change. Despite the reported killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and members of his family, Iran’s governmental, political and state structures remained intact. The country suffered serious human and material losses, but its political system survived. Washington and Tel Aviv failed to achieve the fundamental political objective of their campaign.
Iran’s response was not confined to military resistance. Tehran combined its defence strategy with diplomacy, economic pressure and the calculated use of its geographical position. Iranian negotiators understood the political circumstances facing Washington. Trump needed an agreement that he could present to American voters as a diplomatic achievement before the midterm elections. Tehran recognised this urgency and used it to strengthen its negotiating position.
Drawing on decades of experience in negotiations with Western governments, Iranian representatives maintained their demands and avoided concessions that could be presented as an unconditional American victory. Their priorities included sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, security assurances, an end to the American naval blockade and a lasting ceasefire. Iran wanted a settlement that addressed its security and political interests rather than an agreement designed primarily to provide Trump with a campaign success.
Diplomatic activity intensified during the final week before the American elections. Qatar played a central role in facilitating communication between Washington and Tehran, while Pakistan also contributed to mediation efforts. Discussions in Doha and proposals concerning the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz became important parts of the negotiating process. Iran presented a revised two-day proposal for reopening the waterway, linking progress to movement on its demands. Trump continued to express optimism about a possible agreement, but Tehran maintained its position. Even after the elections, negotiations remained active. On November 7, Qatar’s prime minister said that mediation was continuing, significant progress had been made and a settlement was possible. No comprehensive agreement had yet been reached.
The Strait of Hormuz has become one of Iran’s most important strategic instruments. A substantial share of global oil and gas shipments passes through this narrow waterway. Any disruption affects international energy markets, shipping costs and economies dependent on imported fuel. Iran has used its geographical position and military capabilities to turn the security of this maritime passage into a source of diplomatic leverage. The conflict has consequently expanded beyond military targets and begun affecting the wider global economy.
This strategy has increased the political and economic costs for Trump. Rising energy prices and the consequences of a prolonged war have become domestic concerns. The administration has faced growing pressure to demonstrate that the conflict has produced tangible results. Netanyahu, meanwhile, has encountered political divisions and uncertainty over his parliamentary future. Iran has incorporated these domestic pressures into its diplomatic calculations, maintaining resistance on the battlefield while using negotiations and its influence over the Strait of Hormuz to strengthen its position.
Has Iran, therefore, taken revenge on Trump and Netanyahu for the regime-change operation? The political developments provide a basis for examining this argument. Iran’s political system survived the campaign. Trump’s Republican Party lost control of both chambers of Congress, while Netanyahu’s bloc failed to secure a parliamentary majority. These outcomes have exposed the domestic political consequences of the war for its principal architects. The American election results also reflect economic concerns and other domestic issues, but the Iran conflict became an important part of the political burden facing the Trump administration.
The wider lesson is that military superiority does not automatically translate into political success. Destroying military infrastructure and changing a country’s political system are fundamentally different objectives. Iran suffered serious losses but preserved its state structure, maintained its negotiating position and used its strategic geography to influence international economic calculations.
Through military resistance, diplomatic patience and the strategic use of the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has turned a campaign intended to weaken its political system into a source of pressure on Washington and Tel Aviv. The final outcome of the confrontation remains uncertain, but the political consequences of the war are already being felt far beyond Iran.
The writer is a media and strategic communication professional and international relations analyst. X: @TMAwanOfficial
