Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
President Donald Trump has reduced many of the traditional tools through which the United States projected influence abroad. USAID has largely ceased to function, Voice of America is trapped in legal disputes and the State Department has sharply cut back its staff and programs. Stricter visa rules have made the country less welcoming and Trump’s confrontational dealings with allies have weakened trust. Observers, including former NATO official Jamie Shea, describe these developments as a form of American “soft power suicide.” Many analysts argue that China benefits from this American retreat. Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of soft power, warned that China might move into the space the United States is leaving behind. Some commentators suggest that Trump’s policies have strengthened China’s diplomatic appeal. Yet the rivalry between the two powers is not a straightforward contest. The United States historically emphasized values, political principles and cultural attraction. China’s method has been more practical, relying on economic incentives, development assistance, infrastructure projects and training programs. Many countries, particularly in the global South, tend to accept both American and Chinese engagement rather than choosing one side.
Although China appears more reliable and accessible as Washington pulls back, it has not turned into a global soft-power leader. Beijing continues to promote its economic model and development experience, but it has actually reduced assistance to poorer countries in recent years. Its pledges to Latin American and SCO countries have declined compared with past years. These reductions reflect pressure on China’s own economy and concerns about the rising debts of Belt and Road Initiative partners. China still lends to resource-rich and high-income countries, but it is increasingly cautious toward low-income borrowers, at times suspending new loans entirely, as in Ethiopia. China has also not attempted to replace USAID. Its official aid budget has always been much smaller than Washington’s previous levels and most of it has taken the form of loans rather than grants. Recent cases of Chinese humanitarian support, such as in Cambodia and Nepal, remain isolated and do not represent a shift toward broader international assistance.
Chinese companies continue to expand trade and investment in regions such as Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. However, commercial interests than by state planning. The United States has also stepped back from promoting democracy and human rights, leaving open a space China could theoretically occupy. However, China has shown little interest in exporting a political model. Its officials emphasize principles such as noninterference and the idea that modernization can take different forms, but they do not present a clear ideological system for others to adopt. China’s diplomatic messaging focuses largely on contrasting itself with the West. Officials often criticize U.S. dominance, accuse Washington of abandoning its international obligations and portray China as a stable and dependable actor. Xi Jinping’s recent speeches highlight calls for a “fairer” world order and multipolarity, but they stop short of offering a detailed vision of global governance. In Africa, Chinese diplomats and scholars present China as a partner that respects national choices, unlike the more intrusive United States. Yet when foreign participants ask for clear guidance on how to replicate China’s developmental achievements, Chinese officials rarely provide specific steps. They often repackage Western vocabulary referring to China as a type of democracy rather than outlining unique doctrines. This reluctance limits China’s ability to turn admiration into emulation.
Cultural exports have recently helped China’s image. Popular products such as the Labubu toys, the animated film Ne Zha 2 and several video games have increased China’s visibility among foreign audiences. Technologies like DeepSeek have also enhanced interest in Chinese innovation. However, cultural popularity alone does not necessarily translate into acceptance of China’s political or ideological positions. Public opinion surveys show a mixed picture. Latin America and Africa hold generally positive views, while Europe and the Asia-Pacific remain largely distrustful due to security concerns. Even where China is respected as an economic partner, trust in its global leadership remains low. A Pew survey found that most respondents do not have confidence in Xi Jinping to manage international affairs responsibly.
Moreover, countries that depend heavily on Chinese loans often express unease. Ethiopian students and officials worry about high debts and fear that China could control key infrastructure if loans go unpaid. Protests in Central Asian countries against Chinese projects also show rising anxiety. These tensions sit alongside appreciation for China’s economic engagement. China’s apparent gains therefore come with limits. It benefits from the American withdrawal but is careful not to take on burdens that could expose it to greater criticism or financial risk. It promotes itself as a dependable partner but avoids deeper ideological commitments or the creation of a comprehensive global framework. For now, China prefers to highlight the contrast between its own approach and that of the United States, while maintaining flexibility and avoiding overextension.
