Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
A recent report released by the Middle East Institute has drawn attention to a strategic shift that is unfolding quietly but steadily across the Arabian Gulf. Authored by Mohammed Soliman, a senior fellow at the Institute, the study argues that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is no longer a peripheral player in advanced technologies. Instead, it is emerging as a central arena in the intensifying technological competition between the United States and China. At the heart of this argument lies the concept of a collective “GCC AI Stack”: a coordinated framework through which Gulf States can pool resources, infrastructure, regulation and talent to shape their technological future. For years, Washington, Beijing and a handful of East Asian and European capitals, dominated discussions about advanced computing and digital innovation. The Gulf’s role was often reduced to that of an energy supplier or a consumer of imported technologies. This perception is now outdated. With substantial financial reserves, ambitious national visions and a growing appetite for strategic autonomy, Gulf States are positioning themselves as builders rather than buyers of next-generation technological systems.
The report highlights that the GCC’s importance is not simply a function of wealth. It stems from a convergence of factors: access to energy at scale, political will to invest in long-term infrastructure and a geographic position that connects Asia, Europe and Africa. Together, these factors make the Gulf uniquely suited to host large-scale computing facilities and data infrastructure that underpin modern technological development. From a geopolitical perspective, this shift carries significant implications. The rivalry between the United States and China is no longer confined to trade tariffs or military deployments. It has expanded into standards-setting, supply chains and control over the tools that will shape future economies. In this contest, computing capacity and digital ecosystems matter as much as aircraft carriers once did. The GCC’s evolving technology landscape, therefore, becomes a strategic variable rather than a neutral backdrop.
One of the report’s central arguments is that Gulf States can act as a force multiplier for American technological capacity. This does not imply subordination or dependency. Rather, it suggests a partnership model in which Gulf investments complement American innovation. The United States retains a lead in research, advanced chips and foundational technologies, but it faces constraints in scaling infrastructure rapidly at home due to regulatory, environmental and political hurdles. The Gulf, by contrast, can move faster in building large facilities and deploying capital, provided there is strategic alignment. This alignment, however, cannot be taken for granted. Gulf States maintain diversified foreign relations and have cultivated economic ties with China over the past two decades. Beijing has been an active partner in infrastructure development, telecommunications and digital services across the Middle East. The report does not frame this as a zero-sum dilemma for the Gulf. Instead, it argues that without a clear and attractive policy pathway from Washington, Gulf capitals will continue to hedge, seeking benefits from both sides.
What distinguishes the MEI report is its emphasis on collective action within the GCC. Individual Gulf states have already launched ambitious national initiatives, from Saudi Arabia’s technology-driven Vision 2030 to the United Arab Emirates’ push to become a regional innovation hub. While these efforts are impressive, the report contends that fragmentation limits their strategic impact. A shared framework—covering infrastructure standards, data governance, investment rules and workforce development would allow the GCC to punch above its collective weight. Such coordination would also reduce duplication and unhealthy competition among Gulf neighbors. Instead of racing to outbid one another for the same projects, states could specialize within a shared ecosystem. One country might focus on large-scale infrastructure, another on regulatory innovation and a third on talent development. The combined effect would be greater than the sum of its parts.
For the United States, the message is equally clear. Engagement with the Gulf on advanced technologies cannot be an afterthought or confined to security dialogues. It requires a coherent policy that treats Gulf partners as stakeholders in a shared technological future. This includes providing clarity on export controls, encouraging joint ventures and investing in people-to-people links such as education and research exchanges. Without such steps, Washington risks ceding influence by default rather than design. At the same time, the report underscores that Gulf States are not merely seeking external validation. Their interest in developing advanced technological capabilities is rooted in domestic imperatives. Economic diversification, job creation for a young population and the need to manage increasingly complex societies all demand more sophisticated tools. Technology is seen not as a luxury but as a necessity for governance and growth in a post-hydrocarbon era.
Critically, the report does not ignore the risks. Rapid technological development raises questions about regulation, data protection and social impact. A collective GCC approach could help address these concerns by establishing shared norms and safeguards. It could also provide a platform for dialogue with external partners, ensuring that cooperation is grounded in mutual trust rather than transactional convenience. The broader implication of the MEI study is that the global technology landscape is becoming more multipolar. Power is diffusing not only among states but also across regions that can offer scale, stability and strategic alignment. The Gulf’s rise in this domain reflects a broader trend in which economic and technological agency is no longer monopolized by traditional centers.
