BY F. Z. Khan
The recent round of Pakistan-Afghanistan talks in Turkey offers a fragile but vital opportunity to solve not only the acute security problems on our western border, but also an equally existential resource threat: the reported move to turn shared rivers into instruments of coercion. Reports that dam projects on the Kunar-Kabul-Chitral systems are being advanced with outside assistance, and could be used to throttle downstream flows into Pakistan, must be confronted with steadiness, law and unambiguous deterrence. Millions of Pakistanis depend on those waters for food, income and life itself; this is not an academic dispute to be shelved for later.
Hydrology and geopolitics are now intersecting in dangerous ways. The Kabul basin contributes roughly 16.5 million acre-feet of water annually into the Indus system. It is the water that irrigates wheat, maize and sugarcane across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and supports industry and households downstream. Reports of planned or ongoing projects — Naghlu, Darunta, Shahtoot, Shah Waros, Gamberi, Baghdara and others — raise real fears that unilateral upstream storage or manipulation could reduce flows at critical times, amplifying droughts, food insecurity and social unrest in Pakistan. Any deliberate withholding of transboundary water is not just an economic assault; in practical terms it is an attack on livelihoods and human security.
We must be frank: water coercion is a form of strategic pressure already seen in the region. Past Indian projects on western rivers have tested trust under the Indus Waters Treaty; Pakistan’s experience makes clear why vigilance is necessary. If Afghanistan, whether by intent or under external influence, builds and operates storage without transparent data-sharing, joint studies and treaty-based mechanisms, it would effectively convert natural resources into a diplomatic cudgel. This is a scenario Pakistan cannot accept.
But rhetoric alone will not safeguard our rivers. The talks with the Afghan Taliban must produce practical, provable commitments from Kabul on three basics: immediate and verifiable cessation of any unilateral works that can materially alter downstream flows; the sharing of hydrological data and engineering designs; and acceptance of joint or neutral technical studies (with recognized international experts where required) to assess impacts. These are modest, technical, and reasonable prerequisites to avoid escalation, and not demands that impinge on Afghanistan’s development per se. Transparency and cooperation will separate legitimate development from coercive intent.
At the same time, diplomacy must be backed by credible technical and legal preparedness. Pakistan’s investment in projects such as the proposed Chitral River Diversion, aimed at securing flows and augmenting storage and generation capacity, is a legitimate sovereign response to protect downstream areas and habitat. Equally, Islamabad must continue to build domestic resilience through improved storage, water-use efficiency, and modern irrigation practices. These defensive steps reduce vulnerability while keeping the door open for negotiated, binding solutions.
Security cannot be divorced from resource disputes. During the Turkey rounds Islamabad has repeatedly linked water concerns with the core demand that Afghanistan must stop permitting militant groups, especially TTP elements, to use Afghan soil and launch attacks into Pakistan. Talks that address one problem while ignoring the other will be incomplete. If Afghanistan genuinely seeks normal relations and international legitimacy, it must understand that permitting cross-border terrorism and colluding directly or indirectly in a plan to weaponize water are mutually reinforcing behaviours that will harden Pakistan’s response. The talks in Turkey must therefore extract concrete counterterrorism commitments alongside water transparency measures.
Question is how should Pakistan calibrate its approach? First, it must pursue technical transparency: insist on joint hydrological monitoring and independent impact assessments. Second, we must pursue legal avenues: documenting any unilateral construction and being ready to present the facts in international fora if cooperation is refused. Third, keep diplomatic pressures high: engage mediators and regional partners to clearly underline that weaponizing water will destabilise the entire region. Finally, keep calibrated defensive options on the table, not as a first resort but as a deterrent to miscalculation.
Above all, this moment calls for sober pragmatism, not overheated nationalism. Pakistan’s argument is straightforward and morally persuasive: that shared rivers are shared responsibilities; that development is legitimate; coercion is not. Afghanistan must therefore be made to see that preserving downstream flows and halting cross-border militancy are preconditions for durable regional stability, and for Afghanistan’s own prosperity. India, too, must recognize that attempts to instrumentalize India against Pakistan will only invite countermeasures and prolonged instability.
The talks in Turkey are therefore consequential. These can either produce a clear roadmap for transparency, joint management and counterterrorism cooperation or else these can deepen mistrust and push the region towards dangerous escalations over both guns and water. Pakistan continues to negotiate in good faith, but with evidence-based firmness: water security is national security, and the lives of millions depend on how responsibly our neighbours, Afghanistan and India, manage transboundary rivers. The message must be simple and unambiguous cooperation or accountability; development or deprivation; dialogue or consequences. The future of millions of Pakistanis should not be left to hydrological chance or geopolitical gambits.
(The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at [email protected])
