By Shamim Shahid
Amidst its relentless efforts to influence internal matters in war-devastated Afghanistan, Pakistan has also intensified strikes against the banned TTP and other militants on both sides of the border. Although the Taliban officially remained silent on the recent drone attacks, Afghanistan’s state news agency BAKHTAR confirmed civilian casualties, including women and children, in displaced Pakistani tribesmen camps in Khost.
Ironically, while Pakistan expends resources on political and diplomatic gatherings to win over Afghan elites and pressure the Taliban, it simultaneously pushes for the early evacuation of Afghan refugees. This forced repatriation has deepened uncertainty for millions of Afghans—particularly the youth—about their future, while also fueling resentment inside Pakistan, where many question the violation of basic constitutional and human rights granted to war-affected Afghans.
Pakistan is pressuring Afghans to return at a time when the Taliban regime itself is struggling with serious internal and external challenges. On one side, the Taliban are seeking international recognition; on the other, they are criticized for curbing human and women’s rights under their rigid interpretation of Islam. Yet, credit for the Taliban’s return to power goes less to their battlefield victories and more to the Doha Accord of February 2020, orchestrated by the United States. While the Taliban present the financial inflows from that deal as “compensation for U.S. defeat,” in reality, the accord allowed Washington to retain indirect leverage over Afghanistan’s affairs.
It is undeniable that the Taliban’s restoration to power in August 2021 was not solely the result of force but largely enabled by that accord, which simultaneously marginalized genuine Afghan leaders, many of whom remain scattered across the globe. Pakistan, by hosting a galaxy of non-Pashtoon leaders in Islamabad in August 2021, played a role in facilitating the Taliban’s comeback. Yet, over the last four years, these leaders have remained largely powerless. Recently, however, many anti-Taliban elites have begun moving closer to Pakistan once again.
In truth, Pakistan cannot act in isolation on Afghan affairs; its policies remain deeply linked to the calculations of U.S.-led allies and, increasingly, to the interests of China and Russia. All three powers are vying for influence over Afghanistan’s economic and strategic sectors, often through proxies, including extremist groups with hidden backers and sponsors.
Just days ago, an Islamabad-based think tank attempted to host a dialogue that included women and other anti-Taliban voices. However, former U.S. diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad disrupted the effort with a tweet accusing Pakistan’s intelligence agencies of interference. The episode underlines the fragility of Pakistan’s initiatives and the urgent need for Islamabad to rethink its approach.
Instead of over-relying on the Taliban, Pakistan must broaden its engagement to include Afghanistan’s political, tribal, and clerical leadership. It is increasingly clear that Taliban leaders themselves are under the influence of competing foreign powers—from U.S.-aligned actors to Chinese and Russian overtures—while Britain, through its intelligence networks, continues to safeguard its own long-term stakes in the region.
Currently, much of Afghanistan’s Pashtoon leadership capable of steering the country towards stability remains scattered in the West, while non-Pashtoon leaders have found refuge in Turkey. Within Afghanistan, only former president Hamid Karzai has maintained his presence. Despite his critics, Karzai continues to inspire hope among Afghans by calling for sovereignty and independence. Though he maintains a cautious relationship with the Taliban, his advocacy for women’s education and broader inclusivity positions him as a potential mediator in Afghanistan’s future political settlement.
Pakistan’s past attempts at installing its preferred regimes in Kabul have repeatedly failed. Likewise, U.S.-led allies, China, Russia, and the European Union all recognize that peace in Afghanistan is essential for regional stability. Given its geography, history, and influence, Pakistan remains a key stakeholder; without its cooperation, sustainable peace in Afghanistan is impossible.
Therefore, it is in Pakistan’s own strategic interest to move beyond tactical strikes, refugee expulsions, or reliance on narrow Taliban channels. Instead, Islamabad must initiate a broader reconciliation process aimed at durable and permanent peace in Afghanistan. Such a policy will not only serve Pakistan and Afghanistan but also contribute to the security and stability of the wider region and the world at large.
