The Beijing Triangle diplomacy: Between Islamabad and Kabul

Dr. Islom khon Gafarov | Mr. Bobur Mingyasharov

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to play an active role on the international stage, guided by the principles of its Global Security Initiative (GSI). One of the key pillars of this initiative is a focus on cooperative security. The initiative emphasizes the importance of inter-state collaboration in formulating collective responses to emerging challenges and threats.

Based on this principle, China has intensified its diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The increased activity of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, accompanied by armed incidents along the border, the closure of trade crossings, and the large-scale deportation of Afghan nationals from Pakistani territory, reflects the persistent instability in relations between the two countries. These developments not only hinder the implementation of several regional and interregional infrastructure and economic initiatives but also undermine the overall security environment in South Asia. In this context, China, seeking sustainable stability in the region from both geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives, has positioned itself as an interested mediator.

As part of these efforts, an informal trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan took place in Beijing on May 21, 2025. The meeting was attended by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. The meeting demonstrated China’s increasingly strengthened role as an active mediator in resolving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Beijing had previously made attempts to maintain diplomatic balance between the parties, this meeting marked the first prominent manifestation of China’s initiative in this sphere. A natural question arises: why now, and for what reasons is China advancing this initiative?

Kashmir Crisis Lessons

The conflict between India and Pakistan, which unfolded in April-May of this year, served as a warning signal for Beijing, demonstrating that the South Asian region remains vulnerable in terms of security and prone to spontaneous crises. Such events undermine China’s long-term strategic calculations, as it regards the region as an integral part of its global strategy. South Asia provides Beijing with access to the Indian Ocean and forms key logistical routes connecting China with the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Despite the temporary lull surrounding the Kashmir agenda, the risk of escalation persists in another hotspot of tension – the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Given the high likelihood of a new crisis emerging, this vector of instability requires preventive resolution. Regional conflicts of this nature are capable not only of destabilizing South Asia but also of inflicting serious damage on China’s international initiatives, including its infrastructure and economic projects within the framework of the global Belt and Road strategy.

Pakistan’s Priority

In the South Asian context, Pakistan serves as a key strategic partner for China. The stability and security of Pakistan represent a priority for Beijing, underpinning its efforts to assist Islamabad in strengthening its western borders, particularly along the Afghan frontier. In light of the recent Kashmir crisis, the possibility of rapprochement between India and Afghanistan has emerged, which may potentially lead to the formation of a new strategic environment configuration around Pakistan.

Such a development could weaken not only Pakistan’s geopolitical position but also undermine China’s interests in the region. In this context, Beijing is invested in conducting preventive diplomacy aimed at stabilizing the situation along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These efforts could secure Pakistan’s potentially vulnerable rear in the event of a new confrontation with New Delhi, as well as minimize the risks of a new regional conflict that could threaten the implementation of China’s strategic initiatives in South Asia.

Security of the CPEC

From an economic standpoint, the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose significant risks for China in the implementation of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. China views this initiative as a cornerstone of its global political and economic strategy, as it provides a critical route to the Indian Ocean. Consequently, Beijing seeks to safeguard CPEC by fostering reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan and by deepening strategic cooperation with both countries. The escalation of tensions serves as a catalyst for regional instability, most acutely observed in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Terrorist activity in these areas results in casualties not only among Pakistani civilians but also among Chinese nationals, prompting increased Chinese engagement in regional security issues. China has employed its diplomatic and strategic instruments to help stabilize the situation. The call for reconciliation issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs last year, along with the trilateral meeting held in May of this year, underscores Beijing’s intent to move from declarative statements to practical actions aimed at strengthening regional security.

Kabul’s Emerging Strategic Orientation

Afghanistan’s foreign policy is becoming increasingly diversified. As relations with Pakistan continue to cool, Kabul has been intensifying its engagement with other partners – such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and several Arab states. This shift reduces Afghanistan’s geopolitical alignment with Pakistan and broadens its foreign policy choices.

Such developments may raise concerns in China, as Afghanistan’s growing engagement with other states could weaken Beijing’s ability to maintain strategic oversight over key regional projects, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This is likely why China seeks to keep Afghanistan closely linked to Pakistan within a notional “zone of strategic influence”.

Iran factor

Iran also constitutes an important element in the regional dynamics. In recent years, Iran’s relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan have gradually strengthened. Tehran’s actions during the Kashmir crisis clearly demonstrated its regional diplomatic activism. Then-Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reached out to both Pakistan and India, seeking to act as a regional mediator. By emphasizing its role as a so-called “shield” of the Islamic world, Tehran may also aspire to mediate the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, Iran’s increased activity has raised concerns in China. Beijing appears reluctant to cede influence in the region to Tehran. Accordingly, China may be seeking to prevent the strengthening of Iran’s diplomatic initiative, aiming to keep the dialogue process between Afghanistan and Pakistan under its own control.

Hidden Objectives of the West

Following the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from Afghanistan, Western states have effectively abdicated responsibility for regional stability. This shift in approach may indicate the West’s intent to encourage greater Chinese involvement in Afghanistan and, more broadly, in South Asian affairs. Driven by a combination of strategic interests – from geoeconomic projects to security concerns, including threat prevention in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region – China finds itself compelled to assume part of the burden of maintaining regional balance. The strengthening of China’s presence in and around Afghanistan is a logical consequence of the changing security architecture in South Asia.

In this context, it can be assumed that Western actions were at least partly strategically calculated. Redirecting China’s focus toward the highly uncertain and conflict-prone South Asian region could limit Beijing’s capacity to actively counterbalance challenges in other key areas such as Southeast Asia or the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the redistribution of Chinese resources and attention toward Afghanistan may serve the interests of Western powers seeking to contain China’s global ambitions.

However, Beijing aims to transform this situation into a strategic advantage. Should China succeed in ensuring stability along the Durand Line, it will significantly bolster its regional presence. This would expand its influence not only in South Asia but also in the Middle East.

Conclusion

China’s Global security initiative is entering a new practical phase. The outcomes of this initiative are already becoming evident in South Asia. Specifically, China is intensifying diplomatic efforts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, taking initial important steps toward regional stability.

The likelihood of easing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan is increasing, as both parties show interest in this process based on their own and external political and economic considerations. This development holds great significance not only for the two countries but also for Central Asian states. Particularly strategic for the region are the Trans-Afghan Corridor and access to southern ports, which could enhance interregional connectivity. This, in turn, aligns with China’s interests, as it views the Trans-Afghan Corridor as a promising link with the Belt and Road Initiative and CPEC.

From this perspective, it is quite probable that China will further engage institutional mechanisms in this process. In particular, Afghanistan’s participation in the BRI may intensify. Currently, Kabul limits itself to expressing confidence in the BRI, but concrete projects within the framework of this initiative may begin soon. Additionally, China may support Afghanistan’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, indicating Beijing’s intent to institutionalize the resolution of contradictions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Authors:

Dr.Islom khon Gafarov, PhD in Political Science, Head of the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, Institute for Advanced International Studies (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Mr. Bobur Mingyasharov, Junior Research Fellow, Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, Institute for Advanced International Studies (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)