The Throne of Thorns

By Muhammad Mohsin Iqbal

The political landscape of South Asia remains one of the most turbulent in the world, where the power of the ballot is often matched—if not surpassed—by the power of the courtroom. In no other region have so many former prime ministers faced such an extensive array of legal battles, ranging from disqualifications and corruption cases to imprisonment and, in rare but tragic instances, the death penalty. The phenomenon is so widespread that political observers describe judicial scrutiny of former leaders as not an exception but a rule, though nearly always seen through the prism of political rivalry and shifting power structures.

Pakistan stands out as the country with the highest number of former prime ministers punished by courts, whether through convictions, disqualifications, or other legal sanctions. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who served three non-consecutive terms, remains the most vivid example. His 2017 disqualification by the Supreme Court in the Panama Papers case, not for corruption but for failing to declare an unwithdrawn salary from his son’s company, set the tone for an era in which technical omissions could end political careers. A year later, accountability courts sentenced him in the Avenfield and Al-Azizia references, leading to imprisonment, though these verdicts were eventually overturned in 2023, allowing him to return to political life.

Imran Khan, too, met a swift judicial downfall, beginning with his 2022 disqualification in the Toshakhana case, followed by imprisonment for the illegal sale of state gifts and a later conviction in the Cipher case. Both he and his foreign minister were handed ten-year sentences for violating the Official Secrets Act, marking one of the most consequential legal actions against any sitting or former Pakistani premier in decades.

Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani was removed from office in 2012 for contempt of court, while Benazir Bhutto, during her years in exile 1999, was convicted in absentia in a corruption case later overturned. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi spent months during 2019 in jail over the LNG scandal, and Raja Pervez Ashraf endured years of legal proceedings stemming from the Rental Power Projects case before his eventual acquittal.

Yet the most somber judicial episode in Pakistan’s history remains the trial and execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. Removed in a military coup and tried for conspiracy to murder, Bhutto’s conviction and hanging have long been viewed as the darkest miscarriage of justice in the region. In March 2024, the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a historic advisory opinion acknowledging that Bhutto had not received a fair trial, offering symbolic vindication decades after his death.

Bangladesh reflects a similarly fraught relationship between politics and the judiciary. The longstanding rivalry between Sheikh Hasina Wajid and Khaleda Zia has repeatedly spilled into the courtroom. Sheikh Hasina herself was imprisoned during the emergency of 2007–2008 on extortion charges later withdrawn. Khaleda Zia, meanwhile, received a ten-year sentence in the Zia Orphanage Trust case and has remained under severe legal and political restrictions ever since. The most extraordinary development occurred on November 17, 2025, when a special tribunal sentenced Sheikh Hasina Wajid to death in absentia for crimes against humanity linked to the brutal suppression of student protests in 2024. The ruling, delivered by the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, cited audio evidence purportedly linking her office to military operations that resulted in more than a thousand deaths. It was a decision unprecedented in South Asian political history.

In Sri Lanka, political leaders have rarely been convicted but frequently investigated. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the world’s first female prime minister, was stripped of her civic rights for seven years in 1980 after being found guilty of abuse of power by a special commission—an action widely regarded as political retribution. Mahinda Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe have each faced inquiries into corruption, misuse of authority, and grave security lapses, though neither has been convicted.

India’s democratic traditions have spared its prime ministers from formal criminal convictions. Yet even here the shadow of the courtroom has loomed. Indira Gandhi was disqualified by the Allahabad High Court in 1975 for minor electoral violations, a judgment that triggered the imposition of the Emergency. Rajiv Gandhi, long after his assassination, remained entangled in the political legacy of the Bofors scandal until courts ultimately cleared his name.

In Nepal, former prime ministers have often faced accusations but seldom convictions. Allegations against figures such as Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, Girija Prasad Koirala, Baburam Bhattarai, and Sher Bahadur Deuba were swept into the broader context of civil war politics, foreign policy tensions, and institutional frailty. Cases were announced with great fanfare but quietly dissolved over time, illustrating a judiciary too weak—or too politicized—to pursue lasting outcomes.

Across South Asia, these stories converge into a familiar pattern. Former leaders are more likely than not to face investigations, arrests, or disqualification once they leave office. The timing of cases frequently coincides with electoral cycles, and the outcomes often hinge less on the evidence than on the prevailing balance of political power. Convictions are celebrated by rivals, condemned by supporters, and frequently overturned when the wheel of politics turns again.

The way forward for South Asia lies in reinforcing judicial independence and establishing transparent, consistent standards for public accountability, so that justice is neither delayed nor used as a political weapon. Until that transformation takes place, the courtrooms of the region will continue to function as extensions of its political battlegrounds, where the fate of leaders is decided long after they have left their offices.