Trump and Munir: A Strategic Embrace or a Dangerous Gamble?

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By Qamar Bashir

In a move as unprecedented as it is consequential, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at the White House on June 18, 2025. The meeting—free of any accompanying Pakistani civilian officials—signals a radical shift in Washington’s diplomatic conduct and casts a long shadow over the fragile equilibrium in South and West Asia.

On the surface, the visit was framed as a gesture of appreciation. Trump lauded Munir for his role in halting the brief but dangerous May standoff between Pakistan and India. He even credited both Munir and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for “preventing a nuclear war.” But beneath the diplomatic pleasantries lies a web of geopolitical maneuvering that could thrust Pakistan into the heart of another foreign war—this time, one against Iran.

Never before has a sitting U.S. President hosted Pakistan’s military chief as a sole representative of the country. In diplomatic protocols, heads of state meet heads of state—not generals. Yet Trump not only met Munir but accorded him a presidential reception and hosted him for a formal feast, elevating the meeting beyond ceremonial. Munir’s image and the Pakistani flag displayed in Times Square during the U.S. Armed Forces National Day celebration in New York further emphasized the significance Washington has placed on this interaction.

This raises serious questions: Why now? Why the Army Chief? And why with such unprecedented fanfare? While the official narrative highlights Munir’s role in halting the May 7–10 India-Pakistan conflict—which began with India’s bombing of alleged “terrorist infrastructure” and ended in mutual missile and drone strikes—the timing of this meeting suggests that Iran, not India, was the primary focus.

The recent escalation between Israel and Iran, where Tehran retaliated forcefully against Israeli airstrikes, has pushed the region to the brink of wider war. The United States, while maintaining an ambiguous stance publicly, is deeply entangled behind the scenes. Should it decide to intervene militarily against Iran, it will require strategic logistics—and here, Pakistan becomes indispensable.

The U.S. is likely to ask Pakistan to replicate its past cooperation during the Cold War and the post-9/11 War on Terror. That could include: Providing air corridors and airbases for U.S. and Israeli aircraft operating near or within Iranian territory. Hosting drone operations, much like the Shamsi airbase was used for targeting inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. Permitting the storage of military hardware—tanks, helicopters, ammunition—on Pakistani soil for logistical support. Enabling overland and aerial supply routes for equipment from the U.S. and NATO to operational theaters near Iran. Offering intelligence and surveillance infrastructure, including satellite uplinks and cyber espionage platforms. Preventing any strategic assistance to Iran, including refusal of refuge, military goods, or moral support.

Such demands, while plausible in Washington’s strategic playbook, would come at an exorbitant cost for Pakistan—economically, politically, and militarily. Internally, such alignment would unleash chaos. Pakistan has a large and politically active Shia population, deeply connected with Iran’s religious leadership. Any military action against Iran involving Pakistan—directly or indirectly—could provoke widespread sectarian unrest, leading to mass protests, civil disobedience, and potentially insurgency-like resistance in major cities.

The political ramifications would be no less severe. Religious and ideological parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, which vocally support oppressed Muslim populations, especially in Palestine and Gaza, will view any alliance with Israel or its backers as betrayal. Iran, being the most consistent supporter of Palestinian resistance, holds immense moral weight in these circles.

Moreover, the general public sentiment across Pakistan—still bruised from past foreign entanglements—would turn sharply against both the military and the civilian government. The Army, which only recently regained national respect after effectively neutralizing Indian aggression in May, risks becoming the people’s enemy once again if it is seen as dragging Pakistan into another foreign war.

Given this explosive domestic environment, the Pakistani military might explore clandestine cooperation with Washington—using its intelligence services, particularly the ISI, to monitor Iranian activities, restrict arms flows, and deny strategic depth to Tehran without making public commitments. But even covert assistance risks exposure. Iran is not Afghanistan. Its counterintelligence and cyber capabilities are robust, and any Pakistani duplicity could result in severe retaliation.

More importantly, even hidden cooperation could further alienate Pakistan from the Muslim world. Countries that recently hailed Pakistan’s restraint and military professionalism in the India-Pakistan conflict would reconsider their support if Pakistan is seen as enabling Western attacks on a fellow Muslim nation.

The most chilling possibility arises from the nuclear dimension of the Israel-Iran conflict. Given Israel’s demonstrated policy of neutralizing perceived existential threats—be it Iraq’s Osirak reactor, Syria’s alleged nuclear facility, or Hezbollah’s arsenals—if Iranian missile attacks were to intensify and overwhelm Israeli defenses, Tel Aviv could resort to tactical or even strategic nuclear strikes to eliminate the Iranian regime once and for all.

Israel has never confirmed nor denied its nuclear arsenal, but its doctrine has always indicated readiness to escalate when cornered. In such a scenario, Iran’s annihilation becomes not a distant threat, but an immediate possibility.

A further complication arises from a widely circulated—but unverified—claim that Pakistan would consider a retaliatory nuclear response if Iran is attacked with atomic weapons. While Islamabad has not officially endorsed this position, its mere circulation has amplified Pakistan’s strategic relevance in the global discourse. It may well be one of the key reasons Trump summoned Munir. In Washington’s calculus, Munir is perceived as the only decision-maker in Pakistan capable of influencing such outcomes swiftly and decisively.

This latent threat—that a nuclear exchange could expand from a bilateral conflict to a regional catastrophe—is what places Pakistan at the most sensitive juncture in its modern history.

Pakistan finds itself on a knife’s edge. Cooperation with the United States may offer short-term gains—economic concessions, military aid, or diplomatic favor—but will cost long-term sovereignty, regional stability, and domestic cohesion. Refusing U.S. demands, on the other hand, may invite economic sanctions, international isolation, or worse—covert destabilization.

This is not the first time Pakistan has been placed in such a conundrum. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it allied with the U.S. under General Zia-ul-Haq. During the War on Terror, General Pervez Musharraf made Pakistan a frontline state. Both times, the Pakistani people paid the heaviest price, and both generals were ultimately discarded by their U.S. allies once their utility was exhausted. Now, another general stands alone at the center of foreign policy, with a weakened civilian government in tow and a volatile neighborhood in every direction.

What Pakistan can do as this critical moment  is to dole out difficult decision making to the parliament and let it churn out possible option to deal with this compelling and overwehlming qualdrum. Even if not very relevant, debates in the parliament and resolution passed by it might give some legitimacy to whatever decision is made. Pakistan must position itself as a peace-broker—not a launchpad—for war. Any support to either side must be conditional on diplomacy. The government must brief the nation on any agreements or negotiations with foreign powers. Silence will breed suspicion and unrest. Pakistan should align with like-minded countries—Turkey, Malaysia, Qatar—that are advocating for de-escalation and multilateral dialogue.

Trump’s meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir was more than symbolic—it was strategic. But strategy without sovereignty is submission. Pakistan has the chance to avoid being pulled into another U.S.-engineered quagmire, but it must tread carefully, courageously, and conscientiously.

The stakes are not only territorial or tactical—they are existential. A single misstep could cost Pakistan its hard-won respect, its internal stability, and even its future. If history teaches us anything, it is this: when a superpower smiles too often at a weaker state, it’s never just diplomacy—it’s demand in disguise.

Let Pakistan choose wisdom over obedience, peace over provocation, and dignity over disaster.

By Qamar Bashir

Press Secretary to the President (Rtd)

Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France

Former MD, SRBC | Macomb, Michigan, USA