The latest escalation began on April 2, 2025, when Washington slapped broad tariffs on global imports, eventually exempting all countries except China. The intent was clear: pressure China into economic concessions
DNA
BEIJING: An increasingly vocal consensus among economists and analysts suggests that the United States may once again lose its trade war with China. Despite the renewed wave of tariffs, sanctions, and investment restrictions under the guise of defending national interests, the American strategy appears outdated, ineffective, and increasingly isolated.
The latest escalation began on April 2, 2025, when Washington slapped broad tariffs on global imports, eventually exempting all countries except China. The intent was clear: pressure China into economic concessions. But Beijing swiftly retaliated, raising its own tariffs, and made it clear that it would not yield to unilateral coercion.
According to Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology, the US failed to account for the dramatic transformation of China’s economy. The China of 2025 is not the export-dependent economy of the past. Today, its growth is largely driven by domestic consumption and investments in high-tech sectors. Over 50 percent of its trade is now with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partners, further reducing dependence on the US.
Powell argues that rather than wilting under pressure, China is expanding its global trade networks and rapidly developing its own technology base—especially in areas the US sought to restrict, like semiconductors and AI. In essence, American sanctions have spurred greater self-reliance and innovation within China.
Professor Radhika Desai of the University of Manitoba points out that the US tariffs were never likely to boost domestic jobs or industries. Instead, they increased inflation, hurt supply chains, and eroded consumer purchasing power. The global reaction to America’s trade war has also been lukewarm. Even close allies like Japan and the European Union have balked at Washington’s tactics. UK leaders now openly admit it would be foolish not to engage with China, the world’s second-largest economy.
Desai argues that China’s model of globalization—focused on shared prosperity and mutual benefit—contrasts sharply with the US approach, which historically has centered on maintaining dominance and economic subordination of others. This ideological divergence is pushing more countries toward China’s cooperative model.
Italian businessman Mauro Lovecchio echoes this view from a European perspective. He says the US approach is increasingly self-defeating and alienating. Tariffs on steel, tech exports, and inflammatory rhetoric have strained ties with traditional allies. Europe, facing economic recovery challenges, is now prioritizing strategic autonomy and seeking stronger trade relations with Asia—including China.
Lovecchio notes that while concerns over market access and tech security are real, they require multilateral cooperation, not unilateral pressure. The use of tariffs and coercion, he warns, may isolate the US at a time when global cooperation is essential.
In summary, the United States’ reliance on outdated tools of economic statecraft is backfiring. China’s economic resilience, diversified trade relationships, and innovation drive are rendering US tactics ineffective. Meanwhile, Washington risks alienating allies and diminishing its global influence.
If the US continues down this path, it may find itself increasingly alone in a world seeking stability, partnership, and shared progress.
