Sohail A. Azmie
Following the Pehlgam terror incident, India launched a military strike on alleged terror hideouts in Pakistan on 7 May, a reckless action lacking strategic acumen and verifiable evidence, despite ongoing investigations, as noted by India’s MEA spokesperson Jaiswal on 12 May. While air domain and LOC saw intense combat in the Four Day Military Confrontation, 7-10 May 2025, with standoff weapons, the navies of both India and Pakistan remained disengaged, raising questions about the strategic value of naval warfare in this context. With a long land border between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, and each other’s military bases well within combat ranges of each other’s weapons, the question then naturally comes: given the Pak-India context, what it means to fight at sea, and to achieve what objectives? How does a short and intense air combat relate to the war at sea?
These questions necessitate strategic contextualization. American maritime strategist Mahan in 1890 posited that decisive fleet engagements were necessary for ‘command of the sea’ facilitating control of trade routes and projecting power ashore. British maritime historian, Julian Corbett in 1910 argued that a navy’s primary job was to influence events on land rather than looking for decisive battles at sea. When it comes to air warfare, the Italian airpower theorist Douhet in 1921 and American Billy Mitchell in 1925, argued for ‘command of the air’ to be a precondition for a decisive victory. On the contrary, Britain’s first air chief Trenchard in 1920s and American airpower theorist Warden in 1988 noted that airpower could be effective in specific, short combat contexts helping a nation to cause paralysis and swift degradation. However, for longer versions of war, airpower alone was not enough to ensure victory.
In past Pak-India wars (1948, 1965, 1971), land was the decisive domain, as hostilities began and ended with territorial gains or losses. Analysts have long viewed air and sea operations as tools to influence land warfare, not as decisive in themselves. However, the 2019 and 2025 conflicts suggest a shift. In 2019, Pakistan’s downing of an Indian MiG-21 and capture of its pilot, and in 2025, air strikes on S-400 systems and shooting of Indian jets, forced India to halt operations rather than escalate, aligning with Trenchard and Warden’s views on airpower’s role in short conflicts. C. Christine Fair, in an interview with Karan Thapar, and PravinSawhney of FORCE magazine, partially support Pakistan’s claims while questioning India’s reported outcomes, highlighting air warfare’s growing significance in narrow operational windows. Here it could potentially mean the one shooting first could dominate the operational space as well media alike.
India often follows, what could be termed as ‘terror turning strategy,’ i.e., using terrorism as a pretext to militarily engage Pakistan. Since Uri attack 2016, India’s terror-response algorithm, particularly under BJP, has been: Terror incident occurs, India blames Pakistan within hours of the incident, state-influenced Indian media begins a relentless war-mongering forcing the Indian government for a revenge, India conducts military action, claims victory, awards military personnel, BJP wins elections. This cyclic pattern repeats within 3-5 years, usually coinciding with the Indian general or major state election schedules. Post-Pehlgam, Indian declared political objective was ‘to strike terror sanctuaries that helped plan and orchestrate Pehlgam incident.’ Pakistan sought ‘to reestablish deterrence to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ Though in both of these modern events airpower played a dominant role, yet nuclear deterrence coupled with India’s limited objectives disincentivised it against expanding and prolonging military action. This could probably have inhibited India from embarking on a military course at or from the sea. Will this remain the case in a future Pak-India confrontation? Will Indian navy threaten Southern Pakistan with long range strike from the sea in sync with IAF? These aren’t simple questions that can be answered in simple yes or no.
Technological advancements, in both air and maritime power domains, coupled with artificial intelligence, social media and strategic communication, combat dominance with ability to inflict reckonable destruction through air and sea combatants could compel the opposing side to (re)think of starting or terminating a war. This does not mean totally negating the other domains of warfare, but requires a balanced approach through an integrated battle-space that coherently combines the combat effects of operations in the multiple domains. With long range strike capabilities, Indian navy could possibly be deployed for combat as a response to Pakistan’s counteraction against India’s initial strike. India’s 2025 strikes across the international border, violating Article 51 of the UN Charter and the 1837 Caroline Doctrine’s necessity and proportionality criteria, suggest a potential shift from its traditional terror-response algorithm. In the future, India may increasingly opt for preemptive strikes inside Pakistan, justifying them by claiming that purported terror hideouts posed imminent threats requiring immediate action. This demands understanding the conflict metamorphosis that continues to evolve in Pak-India context. Under this theorem of kinetic necessity, the role of the Indian navy may figure out prominently should India choose to maintain ‘calm’ in air and land, while imposing a response dilemma upon Pakistan.
Extensive use of inexpensive/ expendable drones by both sides ultimately means, the long-held concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity could be debated, and probably redefined. Grounding of container ship Antonio on 10 May 2025 due to GPS jamming in Eliza shoals near Saudi Coast heralds a new threat to maritime assets. Israel’s pager attacks and use of unmanned systems in almost all domains by several nations around the world signify burdens of ‘being ready at all times’ against India’s capability and willingness to go for these kind of operations without warning. A future war at sea will most probably be the exact transposition of what happened over land in the Four Day Military Confrontation, i.e., drones, electronic warfare and long range weapons. Deployment of drones from surface ships, and even submarines, could be a possibility. Consequently, this shift toward autonomous, low-cost warfare coupled with traditional strikes challenges contemporary military paradigms, compelling opposing sides to adapt to a new era where rapid, unannounced strikes blur the lines between deterrence and provocation, potentially destabilizing regional security.
The writer is an Islamabad-based researcher; his areas of interest include: maritime security, climate change and astropolitics. He can be reached at [email protected]
