Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
University of Okara
The geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over Taiwan has emerged as one of the most perilous fault lines in contemporary international politics. As Taiwan’s de facto independence persists, China’s irredentist claims and America’s security commitments have evolved into a volatile security dilemma. AgataZiętek et al.’s 2025 study applies classical game theory—specifically the Chicken Game to dissect the strategic calculations of Washington and Beijing in this unfolding contest.
Game theory, a mathematical framework for modeling strategic interactions, is used in the article to evaluate decision-making under conditions of mutual interdependence. The key assumption is rational behavior by both players (states), who must consider not only their own strategies but also anticipate the other’s moves. In the Taiwan context, the United States and China are the principal players. Each has a set of strategies ranging from cooperation to defection—and corresponding payoffs that depend on the choices made by both.The authors argue that the U.S.-China rivalry over Taiwan conforms to the dynamics of the Chicken Game, where both players risk catastrophic loss if neither yields. This model is apt for describing situations of brinkmanship, where demonstrating resolve may compel the opponent to back down, but miscalculations could lead to war.
Ziętek et al. delineate a clear asymmetry in preference hierarchies between the two players. For China, the most favorable outcome is peaceful unification with Taiwan, achieving the “Great Rejuvenation” and restoring historical prestige.For the United States, the hierarchy is inverted. The most favorable outcome is Taiwan’s resistance (4), preserving regional stability and reinforcing U.S. credibility with allies. This inverse alignment of preferences establishes an inherent tension: what is a strategic necessity for one actor is a significant loss for the other. The game’s structure ensures that any deviation from the status quo threatens to escalate into mutually destructive conflict, yet neither side fully benefits from simply maintaining the status quo indefinitely.
The security dilemma exacerbated by the lack of trust and the presence of strategic ambiguity, particularly on the part of the U.S. Since 1979, the U.S. has adhered to a policy of ambiguity—neither recognizing Taiwan’s independence nor ruling out military intervention. This deliberate vagueness aims to deter both Chinese aggression and Taiwanese provocation.However, as both sides modernize and expand their military capabilities, ambiguity may no longer suffice. Misinterpretations and overreactions could push the players from the realm of calculated posturing into open conflict. The Chicken Game thus aptly captures the rising tension between fear of escalation and the temptation to assert strategic dominance.An important insight from the Chicken Game is that credibility and irrationality may paradoxically enhance a player’s bargaining position. If one player appears willing to accept massive costs (even irrationally), the other may yield. This brinkmanship, while potentially effective, is inherently unstable.
In this context, both the U.S. and China may resort to mixed strategiesoscillating between firm rhetoric and diplomatic overtures to keep the other side uncertain. The paper suggests that empathyunderstanding the opponent’s preference structure could enable more stable outcomes. However, empathy is often constrained by nationalist narratives and domestic political considerations.Ziętek et al. argue that preserving the status quo though suboptimal for both players may be the most rational equilibrium, given the catastrophic costs of war. The United States must invest in credible deterrence by strengthening alliances and enhancing Taiwan’s asymmetric defense capabilities. Yet, it must simultaneously maintain diplomatic channels to avoid hardening China’s resolve to the point of provocation.Domestic factors also play a role. The U.S. public’s willingness to support war over Taiwan is uncertain, especially in the wake of war fatigue from Afghanistan and Ukraine. Future U.S. presidential administrations may significantly shape the contours of this strategic game.
The application of game theory specifically the Chicken Game—provides a robust analytical lens through which to interpret U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan. Asymmetric stakes, incomplete information and high risks of escalation define the scenario. While war is not inevitable, the cost of strategic missteps is immense. As the authors conclude, only by internalizing the logic of the game and adopting policies that balance deterrence with de-escalation can both powers avoid driving off the metaphorical cliff.
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