Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
South Korea’s reliance on the United States to counter the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has been a cornerstone of its national security strategy for decades. The alliance between Seoul and Washington, solidified by the 1953 defense pact following the Korean War armistice, has long provided South Korea with a sense of security under the American nuclear umbrella. However, this assurance is increasingly being called into question due to both North Korea’s expanding capabilities and shifting dynamics in U.S. foreign policy. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions date back to the Cold War era, culminating in its first successful nuclear test in 2006. Since then, Pyongyang has not only advanced its nuclear arsenal but also developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology capable of reaching American cities. This development raises significant doubts about whether the United States would risk nuclear retaliation to defend South Korea in the event of a conflict. North Korea’s growing capabilities have introduced a new level of uncertainty into the U.S.-South Korea alliance, as the potential costs of American intervention now include direct threats to U.S. soil. Compounding these concerns is the potential return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. During his first term, Trump openly criticized the U.S.-South Korea alliance, framing it in transactional terms and suggesting that the United States bore an undue burden in the partnership. His statements and actions during that time, including private remarks about dismantling the alliance, have fueled apprehension in Seoul about the reliability of American commitments under his leadership. Trump’s approach underscores broader concerns about the United States’ willingness to honor its defense obligations, especially in the face of existential nuclear threats from Pyongyang. These developments have driven South Korea to reconsider its longstanding reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The increasing fragility of this arrangement has led to growing support within South Korea for developing an independent nuclear arsenal. Public opinion surveys reveal a significant shift in attitudes: a 2021 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 71% of South Koreans favor nuclearization, a notable increase from 56% in 2010. This growing public support reflects deep-seated concerns about the reliability of U.S. commitments and the pressing need to address the asymmetric nuclear threat posed by North Korea.
Despite the domestic momentum behind nuclearization, the primary obstacle remains international opposition, particularly from the United States. Washington has consistently opposed nuclear proliferation, even among its allies, and has worked to dissuade Seoul from pursuing an independent nuclear capability. The Biden administration, for instance, has sought to reassure South Korea by reaffirming its security commitments through joint declarations and increased military presence in the region. However, these measures fall short of addressing the core issue: whether the United States would truly risk nuclear retaliation to defend its ally. The debate over South Korea’s nuclearization highlights the limitations of extended deterrence in the current geopolitical context. During the Cold War, similar doubts were expressed by U.S. allies in Europe, who questioned whether Washington would “trade New York for Paris” in a nuclear standoff. Today, South Koreans face a comparable dilemma, exacerbated by the unprecedented nature of the North Korean threat. Unlike other nuclear-armed states, Pyongyang’s regime is uniquely vulnerable to conventional military defeat, making it more likely to resort to nuclear weapons in a conflict. This heightened risk underscores the need for South Korea to reassess its security strategy. Proponents of South Korean nuclearization argue that an independent arsenal would enhance regional stability by creating nuclear parity on the Korean Peninsula. A self-reliant South Korea would be better positioned to deter North Korean aggression without relying on potentially unreliable American guarantees. Moreover, a nuclear South Korea could free the United States to focus on its broader strategic priorities in East Asia, particularly its competition with China. Historical precedents, such as U.S. alliances with nuclear-armed Britain and France, demonstrate that Washington can maintain strong ties with allied nations that possess independent nuclear capabilities. Critics of South Korean nuclearization, however, caution against its potential consequences for the international nonproliferation regime. They argue that South Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could set a dangerous precedent, encouraging other countries to follow suit. Nonetheless, advocates counter that the unique circumstances of the Korean Peninsula, marked by the acute and asymmetric threat from North Korea, justify an exception. Furthermore, they contend that South Korea’s democratic governance and responsible stewardship of advanced technologies make it a trustworthy nuclear power.
In practical terms, South Korea’s path to nuclearization would not require an arsenal comparable to those of great powers like the United States or Russia. A modest stockpile of approximately 100 warheads, coupled with existing delivery systems such as fighter jets and submarines, would suffice to establish credible deterrence against North Korea. This limited capability would address the immediate security challenges without escalating regional tensions unnecessarily. The urgency of this debate is underscored by North Korea’s rapid advancements in nuclear and missile technologies. Under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, Pyongyang has conducted multiple nuclear tests and developed a range of delivery systems, including short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. The regime’s recent efforts to miniaturize nuclear warheads, pursue hypersonic missile technology, and deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles further exacerbate the security dilemma faced by South Korea. These developments, combined with North Korea’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, underscore the inadequacy of existing deterrence mechanisms. The Washington Declaration of 2023, which established a U.S.-South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group, represents a step toward addressing Seoul’s security concerns. However, its provisions fall short of resolving the fundamental issue of extended deterrence. The declaration’s emphasis on rotational deployments and consultation mechanisms does little to mitigate the underlying doubts about U.S. willingness to risk nuclear retaliation for South Korea’s defense. As long as these doubts persist, the debate over South Korea’s nuclearization will remain a central issue in the country’s national security discourse.
The evolving security landscape on the Korean Peninsula demands a reexamination of South Korea’s defense strategy. The combination of North Korea’s expanding nuclear capabilities and uncertainties about U.S. commitments has created a pressing need for South Korea to explore alternative security arrangements. While the prospect of nuclearization raises complex challenges, it also offers a potential solution to the asymmetry that currently destabilizes the region. For South Korea, achieving greater self-reliance in its national defense may be the only viable path to ensuring its long-term security in an increasingly uncertain world.
